Resource Allocation, Party Policy Positioning, and the Exit of Party Factions
Abstract
Party unity is a key feature of the political
landscape. Observed party unity is considered an important element of the
strength of party labels. Yet we do observe that party factions and members
exist from the established party in Western democratic countries over election
periods. In this paper, I argue that, with abundant party resources, the
exercise of party discipline does not necessarily promote cooperative outcomes
among intraparty actors. Parties with ideological positions that are close to
other parties’ publicly established positions (i.e. in relative terms,
“proximate”) create opportunities for factions to receive electoral assistance
and, consequently, reduce their incentives to support their leaders. I
formalize this argument in a game-theoretic model and test it empirically using
party positioning data drawn from comparative election manifestos and
legislative roll-call records in 24 democratic countries covering election
periods from 1945 to 1998. Overall, the analysis shows that, with the presence
of a wealth of party resources high levels of observed unity may increase the
likelihood of factions to split from the established parties.
